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The higher the proportion of non‐executive directors andleadCEO / chair duality
several aspects and dimensions of corporate governancemay influencea CEO Duality
larger firm sizeleadsto CEO duality
firm valueresultingfrom CEO duality
Chicopee MA SearchresultsCEO Luncheons
This includespreventingthe duality of the CEO
‘ sustained underwriting to ultimately reflect the true cost ’ of the population covered(passive) are set byCEO ] Hemsley
Amazon(passive) must be invented byCEO star100%4
to launch its ride - hailing service using vehicles made by Fiat Chrysler ( FCA(passive) is setCEO Waymo
Western culture(passive) has ... been ... influenced byCEO Goichi Suda
to restaurants ' improving performances and also support the proposed moderating effect on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performancecontributesto restaurants ' improving performances and also support the proposed moderating effect on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
in agency conflictsresultsin agency conflicts
to excessive managerial discretionleadsto excessive managerial discretion
the CEO has a concentrated power base that will allow the CEO to make decisions in their own - self interest at the expense of shareholderswill causethe CEO has a concentrated power base that will allow the CEO to make decisions in their own - self interest at the expense of shareholders
a harmony between the board , managers , and shareholders which is more efficient and effective in order to reach the goals of organizationscreatesa harmony between the board , managers , and shareholders which is more efficient and effective in order to reach the goals of organizations
conflict of interest as management may override controls ( p.4221causesconflict of interest as management may override controls ( p.4221
to an agency problemmay also leadto an agency problem
the companies(passive) are influenced bythe companies
to higher return to shareholders sh2leadsto higher return to shareholders sh2
a concentration in the decision - making authority , which , subsequently , affects the board independence in carrying out its oversight and governance roles ( Gul and Leung , 2004causesa concentration in the decision - making authority , which , subsequently , affects the board independence in carrying out its oversight and governance roles ( Gul and Leung , 2004
a dominant CEO ( Daily and Dalton , 1993 ; Jensen , 1993 ) that affects the independence of the board ( Finkelstein and D’Aveni , 1994 ) and provides a wider power and locus of control ( Hambrick and Finkelstein , 1987createsa dominant CEO ( Daily and Dalton , 1993 ; Jensen , 1993 ) that affects the independence of the board ( Finkelstein and D’Aveni , 1994 ) and provides a wider power and locus of control ( Hambrick and Finkelstein , 1987
agency problems in boards , which lead to worse performance than firms with CEO non - dualitycausesagency problems in boards , which lead to worse performance than firms with CEO non - duality
benefits for non - family firms in China ... while non - duality is good for family - controlled firmscreatesbenefits for non - family firms in China ... while non - duality is good for family - controlled firms
to the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non - value enhancing turnovermight ... contributeto the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non - value enhancing turnover
in decreased financial performance for EM firms over timewill resultin decreased financial performance for EM firms over time
to the allocation of relatively more capital to projects with lower growth opportunities , which negatively affects firm valueleadsto the allocation of relatively more capital to projects with lower growth opportunities , which negatively affects firm value
to a decline in performance because of the agency cost if the CEO practices their interest at the expense of the shareholdercan leadto a decline in performance because of the agency cost if the CEO practices their interest at the expense of the shareholder
to performance decline of family - controlled firmsleadsto performance decline of family - controlled firms
shareholder returnsinfluencesshareholder returns
to a higher return on investmentleadsto a higher return on investment
poor performance and slow response to changecausingpoor performance and slow response to change