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The separation of ownership from control in large corporationscan causeagency problems
a framework for the study of separation of ownership and control , which was later identifiedto createagency problem
how incentive to the managementcausesagency problem
that mature and slow - growing firms with ownership structures more likelyto createagency problems
That is why setting standards is very important to our agency , although management takes high measures in implementing these steps “ employees ” will not always adherecausingproblems for the agency
separation of ownership and control offset by ( i ) rights issues provided to top managers ( less than perfect(passive) created byagency problems
Zingales ... that vaguely defined property rightscreateagency problems
separation of ownership and management in the modern corporations(passive) caused byagency problem
The conflict in interest between agent and principalscreatesagency problem
high information asymmetry(passive) caused byagency problems
The previous research of free cash flowcausedagency problem
Would hiring additional peoplecreateagency problems
Conflicts between shareholders and management 's objectivescreateagency problem
company managers(passive) caused byagency problems
Such conflicts between shareholders ’ and managers ’ objectivescreateagency problems
a precedent for other implantsmight causeproblems for the agency
information asymmetry and the dispersion of corporate ownership and control between directors and shareholders ( Singhania and Gupta , 2012(passive) caused byagency issues
Such conflicts between shareholders and other stakeholderscreateagency problem
Such conflicts between shareholders and creditorscreateagency problem
the shareholders - lenders conflict(passive) caused byagency problem
information asymmetry when family firms expand abroad(passive) caused byagency problems
delegation of lending to relationship bankers(passive) caused byagency problems
to become a lot more hands on in the companycreatingagency issues
Brian Pink 's government ’s own negligencecreatingproblems at the agency
this surplus must be distributed as dividends to shareholdersmay causeagency problems
people ... bounded rationality and personal interestscauseagency problems
Divorce between ownership and control linked with differing objectivescreatesagency problems
info asymmetry plus the dispersion of corporate ownership and control between owners and investors ( Singhania and Gupta , 2012(passive) caused byagency issues
strategic performance manipulation ( see , e.g. , Jenkinson , Sousa , and Stucke 2013 , Barber and Yasuda 2017 , Chakraborty and Ewens 2018 , and Brown , Gredil , and Kaplan 2019(passive) caused byagency problems
Many traditional western firms established the rules and incentive devicesto prevent“ agency problem
Misaligned shareholder objectives or opportunistic behavior of diversion of resourcesmay also causeagency problems
Complaints from retiring federal employees about the length of time required to set up their annuity paymentshas createdproblems for the agency
directors and fiduciaries that make decisions based on their shares in a company rather than the rational interest of the actual shareholder(passive) is created byAgency problems
Mid 1 10 billion Small lt 1 billion Chapter 1 Divergent ObjectivescreateAgency Problems
its own repercussionscreateagency problems
Any delegated taskcreatesagency problems
This rapid rate of growthhas createdproblems for the agency
The premium fare structure recommended by a consultantcausedproblems for the agency
weaknesses continueto causeproblems for the Agency
if the person responsible for selling the apartments is a bank or government employee whose compensation is not closely tied to the price(passive) may be createdAgency problems
from the separation of ownership and control , as well as conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders ( Jensen and Meckling , 1976).[1resultingfrom the separation of ownership and control , as well as conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders ( Jensen and Meckling , 1976).[1
to non value - maximizing motives for mergers discuss the various academic theories offered as the rationale for motives induced by the agency problemmay leadto non value - maximizing motives for mergers discuss the various academic theories offered as the rationale for motives induced by the agency problem
To Non Value - Maximizing Motives M&A and Strategic OutlookLeadingTo Non Value - Maximizing Motives M&A and Strategic Outlook
to the possibility of agency costsleadto the possibility of agency costs
in associated agency costshave resultedin associated agency costs
from information asymmetry problems between the originators and investors in the market , which can exacerbate systemic riskresultingfrom information asymmetry problems between the originators and investors in the market , which can exacerbate systemic risk
to high levels of IPO underpricing even when there is little information asymmetry or valuation uncertainty about the stockcan leadto high levels of IPO underpricing even when there is little information asymmetry or valuation uncertainty about the stock
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholderscreateconflicts of interest between managers and shareholders
in risk management ... whereas the evidence suggests that risk management can be the source of internal agency problemsmay resultin risk management ... whereas the evidence suggests that risk management can be the source of internal agency problems
to a series of high - profile boat breakdowns this yearledto a series of high - profile boat breakdowns this year
to non value maximizing motives for me Homework Service iytermpaperckhb.nextamericanpresident.us Currency hedging and corporate governancemay leadto non value maximizing motives for me Homework Service iytermpaperckhb.nextamericanpresident.us Currency hedging and corporate governance
to non value maximizing motives for me architecture and tectonics swot analysis of dell company with alternative strategies business essaymay leadto non value maximizing motives for me architecture and tectonics swot analysis of dell company with alternative strategies business essay
As we have discussed above that high executive ’s(passive) may be caused byAs we have discussed above that high executive ’s
to reduced agency cost by aligning the interests of controlling owners with those of the companyleadingto reduced agency cost by aligning the interests of controlling owners with those of the company
such interactions and provides evidence on the importance of those interactionscreatesuch interactions and provides evidence on the importance of those interactions
to coordination opportunities to be missed in decentralized organizations , which results in agency costsmay leadto coordination opportunities to be missed in decentralized organizations , which results in agency costs
automation , offshoring , and tougher bargaining with labor unionstriggersautomation , offshoring , and tougher bargaining with labor unions
from conflicts of interest that may emerge in contractual relationships when parties are differently informed or uncertainresultingfrom conflicts of interest that may emerge in contractual relationships when parties are differently informed or uncertain
from the separation of management and the ownership of the firmresultsfrom the separation of management and the ownership of the firm
the price distortions(passive) caused bythe price distortions
in agency costs , which are the costs incurred by the owners to prevent managers from deviating from the goal of the firm ( Firer et al . , 2012resultin agency costs , which are the costs incurred by the owners to prevent managers from deviating from the goal of the firm ( Firer et al . , 2012
from agency problems modelsresultingfrom agency problems models
to suboptimal investment decisionscan leadto suboptimal investment decisions
inefficiencies in how resources are allocatedcreateinefficiencies in how resources are allocated
the extent leverage - investment relationship(passive) was caused bythe extent leverage - investment relationship
from property rights being " non - tradable , insecure , or unassignedresult ... as wellfrom property rights being " non - tradable , insecure , or unassigned
to high levels of underpricing even when there is little information asymmetry or valuation uncertainty about the stockcan leadto high levels of underpricing even when there is little information asymmetry or valuation uncertainty about the stock
failure of customers’ trust on marketleadsfailure of customers’ trust on market
from shares used as collateral by boards of directorsresultingfrom shares used as collateral by boards of directors
to overinvestment and poor subsequent firm performanceleadto overinvestment and poor subsequent firm performance
from a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders and between shareholders and debt holdersmay resultfrom a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders and between shareholders and debt holders
to poor investment decisions by going - private candidatesleadingto poor investment decisions by going - private candidates
the firms to use higher than appropriate levels of debt in their capital structuremay leadthe firms to use higher than appropriate levels of debt in their capital structure
insurance companies to not always act in the interests of policyholders and guaranty funds that protect themcan causeinsurance companies to not always act in the interests of policyholders and guaranty funds that protect them
distortions Robert Hall Stanford Agree 5surely createsdistortions Robert Hall Stanford Agree 5
distortions Disagree V likely more Americans have benefited but losses for some are substantialsurely createsdistortions Disagree V likely more Americans have benefited but losses for some are substantial
a plan sponsor or CIO ( henceforth , “ the agent ... to rationally invest in strategies1—including non - robust strategies — that are not in the best interest of principalsmight leada plan sponsor or CIO ( henceforth , “ the agent ... to rationally invest in strategies1—including non - robust strategies — that are not in the best interest of principals
an agent to rationally invest in non - robust strategies — those that do not deliver robust long - term excess returns — hence , not in the best interests of their principalscould leadan agent to rationally invest in non - robust strategies — those that do not deliver robust long - term excess returns — hence , not in the best interests of their principals
from the lacking trust between principals and agentsoriginatefrom the lacking trust between principals and agents
within the organizationscreatedwithin the organizations