to endogenous flotation costs related to the severity of the moral hazard problemleadto endogenous flotation costs related to the severity of the moral hazard problem

to endogenous , state - dependent refinancing costs related to the severity of the moral hazard problemleadto endogenous , state - dependent refinancing costs related to the severity of the moral hazard problem

to reduce agency cost and increase firm performance ( denis 2001 from this explanationwill leadto reduce agency cost and increase firm performance ( denis 2001 from this explanation

earnings management that will ultimately lead to poor quality of corporate earningscan createearnings management that will ultimately lead to poor quality of corporate earnings

to a reduction in the company ’s intrinsic valueleadto a reduction in the company ’s intrinsic value

to this type of behaviorcontributeto this type of behavior

the use of rights offersinfluencethe use of rights offers

company decisions about stock buybacks(passive) are ... influenced bycompany decisions about stock buybacks

the possession of certain information about the company by some parties more than other parties that cause ’s information asymmetry between the partiescausesthe possession of certain information about the company by some parties more than other parties that cause ’s information asymmetry between the parties

from conflicting objectives between shareholders and managersresultingfrom conflicting objectives between shareholders and managers

information to be biased for investorscan causeinformation to be biased for investors

in open disagreementoriginatein open disagreement

to procyclical investment behaviorcontributeto procyclical investment behavior

to the misreporting of financial statementsleadto the misreporting of financial statements

from a self - serving motive in the Japanese independent firmmay resultfrom a self - serving motive in the Japanese independent firm

in lower investment caused due to debt overhangresultin lower investment caused due to debt overhang

from the negative impact of the principal - agent relationshipresultsfrom the negative impact of the principal - agent relationship

in reduced performancecould resultin reduced performance

to agency costs that will negatively impact the companys performancewill leadto agency costs that will negatively impact the companys performance

the managers to have more incentives to hint the private information to users and have less motivation to manage earnings ( Xie et al . , 2003leadsthe managers to have more incentives to hint the private information to users and have less motivation to manage earnings ( Xie et al . , 2003

to agency cost which would have a negative impact on the performance of the companywill leadto agency cost which would have a negative impact on the performance of the company

corporate governancecan influencecorporate governance

underinvestment when firms experience insufficient internal cash flows to finance their growth opportunities because new providers of external capital may require a higher return to protect themselves from managers ’ alignment with existing shareholderscauseunderinvestment when firms experience insufficient internal cash flows to finance their growth opportunities because new providers of external capital may require a higher return to protect themselves from managers ’ alignment with existing shareholders

from the separation of ownership and control as well as on governance mechanismsresultingfrom the separation of ownership and control as well as on governance mechanisms

barrierscan createbarriers

the problems(passive) caused bythe problems

from low - ball bidding to secure a client ’s businesswill resultfrom low - ball bidding to secure a client ’s business

in opportunistic earnings management that will result in the reported apparentresultedin opportunistic earnings management that will result in the reported apparent

in the management of opportunistic actions that reported earningsresultedin the management of opportunistic actions that reported earnings

in the management of opportunistic propertiesresultedin the management of opportunistic properties

to optimal firm valuationleadingto optimal firm valuation

as a consequence of the company financingcreatedas a consequence of the company financing

to the inefficiency of investmentleadsto the inefficiency of investment

them supportto createthem support